The Boers… have all the cunning and cruelty of the Kaffir without his honesty or courage… they could not stand up against our troops for an hour.(1)
By the end of 1879 British policy for Zululand, and to a lesser extent, theTransvaal, became aimless. The reason for this lack of purpose was clear. Circumstances had changed since the first invasion in January. Mainly due to on-going adverse press reporting at home, Disraeli’s government was on the verge of collapse as a direct consequence of the war and with it went Britain’s political enthusiasm for further colonial development or military adventures in southern Africa. Worse still, the setbacks experienced by Britain in the Zulu War had sent a clear message to her brooding adversaries, especially to the Boers in the Transvaaland Orange Free State. Even the Russians had woken up to Britain’s vulnerability to Russian naval vessels which could ‘stand off’ her ports in South Africa.(3) The reason was clear to all; if the British lion could be seriously mauled by an ill-equipped force of part-time warriors, a well prepared and trained European force would undoubtedly fare even better.